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on 21 August 1938 a woman living in Bognor regis, a seaside town
on the south coast of england, wrote a letter to the Director of the
pass port Control office in London. her brother-in-law, she ex plained,
was ‘making an application for himself and his wife Lucie for a visa
for india’, where he intended to practise as a dental surgeon. ‘i am
ready to guarantee and to keep at his disposal a sum of £300 for his
expenses’, she continued, ‘as well as to provide the tickets necessary
for the journey to india.’ The following month the dentist in question,
ernst schubert, sent a sheaf of documents, including CVs for himself
and his wife, from his dental practice in Vienna to the passport
Control office. ‘in order to support my application’, he wrote in the
covering letter, ‘i am pointing to my spotless past and i am giving the
assurance that i shall fulfil all my duties towards Government and
population.’1
his application was forwarded to the Government of india in
new Delhi, who replied by telegram to the india office in Whitehall
on 6 october stating: ‘Dr. e. B. schubert is apparently Austrian refu -
gee. Government of india therefore consider he should not be grant-
ed visa unless someone in india is responsible for finding him em -
ployment and for his support.’ Alternatively, ‘if he obtains German
passport’, he needed only to ‘deposit cost of return journey or have
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return passage.’2 Why was this the case? After annexing the country
in March 1938, the nazis had decreed that Austrian passports would
become invalid at the end of that year. As such, anyone who left the
country on an Austrian passport would not be able to return after
that point. And for their part, the British government wanted to
ensure that, in the event that refugees became destitute or a burden
on the state, they could be returned to their countries of origin.
With no contacts in india, the only feasible option for the schuberts
was therefore to renounce their Austrian citizenship and apply for
passports of the country which had, since annexing their country,
begun to systematically persecute them as Jews—causing them to
want to leave in the first place. After being informed of the stipula-
tions in october 1938, the schuberts clearly abandoned their applica-
tion. ‘since the date of writing to Dr. ernst schubert’, G. W. Berry of
the British passport Control office in Vienna wrote in late november,
‘we have not heard from him. i am afraid that the india office have
imposed conditions which really amount to a refusal. no emigrant,
once out of this country, can hope (!) to be able to return.’3
The case of the schuberts illustrates the complex nature of re -
search into the topic of German-speaking Jews who sought or found
refuge in British india during the second World War. not only were
multiple actors involved, spread out over a wide geographical area,
but applicants also had to deal with a shifting political situation in
which the criteria for entry to india were beyond their control and
frequently modified. The researcher therefore faces a significant chal-
lenge in attempting to make sense of how these various dynamics
interacted, and their effects on those who applied for or who were
granted refuge in British india. The topic also presents logistical chal-
lenges: primary source material is spread across archives in the
united Kingdom, india, the united states, and israel, not to mention
the potential for collecting oral testimony. As such, a truly compre-
hensive study would probably have to be written collaboratively.
This is very much an emerging field of inquiry. At the time of
writing, there are fewer than ten studies in total,4 despite the fact that
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4 The most comprehensive is Margit Franz’s monograph Gateway India:
Deutschsprachiges Exil in Indien zwischen britischer Kolonialherrschaft, Maharad -
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the number of Jewish refugees in india was not insignificant: in 1943,
the Jewish relief Association in Bombay, one of several Jewish aid
organizations involved in helping the refugees, calculated their num-
ber to be 1,080. A more recent ‘cautious estimate’ by anthropologist
shalva Weil suggests that the figure would likely also include an
additional ‘several hundred’ refugees who arrived in india prior to
1939, unbeknownst to the Jewish aid organizations, meaning that the
total would ‘certainly exceed 2000 souls’.5
Whatever the means by which they were able to reach india,
German-speaking Jews on the subcontinent, the majority of whom
arrived before the outbreak of the second World War, were compar-
atively fortunate. Despite a policy of internment in British india that
affected all male refugees over the age of 16 (much stricter than the
internment policy implemented in Britain itself), and despite many
witnessing the violent aftermath of the partition of india at the end of
British colonial rule in 1947, these Jews survived the war relatively
well fed and, in many cases, having been able to support themselves
financially through employment that corresponded to their training
and expertise. some even managed to make contacts and establish
professional networks that enriched their later careers.6
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schas und Gandhi (Graz, 2015), which examines the experiences of Jewish as
well as non-Jewish German speakers in india from the early 1930s to the late
1940s. Atina Grossmann’s ongoing research into Jewish exile in non-euro -
pean destinations, including india, has produced a number of outputs so far,
the most recent of which include: ‘remapping survival: Jewish refugees and
Lost Memories of Displacement, Trauma, and rescue in soviet Central Asia,
iran, and india’, in Mark edele, sheila Fitzpatrick, and Atina Grossmann
(eds.), Shelter from the Holocaust: Rethinking Jewish Survival in the Soviet Union
(Detroit, 2017), 185–218, and ‘Transnational Jewish stories: Displacement,
Loss and (non)restitution’, in Jay Geller and Leslie Morris (eds.), Three Way
Street: Jews, Germans, and the Transnational (Ann Arbor, 2016), 362–84.
5 shalva Weil, ‘From persecution to Freedom: Central european Jewish refu -
gees and their Jewish host Communities in india’, in Anil Bhatti and
Johannes h. Voigt (eds.), Jewish Exile in India, 1933–1945 (new Delhi, 1999),
64–84, at 72.
6 one example is the concert pianist elise Braun Barnett, who hosted the
world-famous sitar player ravi shankar as a guest professor at new York’s
City College in 1968, twenty years after she left india for the united states.
see Franz, Gateway India, 228.
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The nature of the entrance criteria set by the British colonial
authorities (which will be discussed later) meant that refugees were
pre dominantly, although not exclusively, middle class. statistics gath-
ered by the Jewish relief Association in December 1939 show the ‘pro -
fessions and Trades’ of the 591 registered male and female refu gees in
india at that time: 32.5 per cent were in ‘industry, arts, instructional
service’, 36.5 per cent in ‘Trade & Law’, and 31 per cent ‘Doctors,
nurses, domestic services, etc.’7 While these figures broadly reflected
the professional composition of German-speaking Jews more gener-
ally, the number of medical practitioners, particularly doctors, was
disproportionately high.
recent interest in what historian Atina Grossmann calls the
‘Asiatic’ experience of the holocaust is connected, first, to a broader
trend in historical scholarship to ‘de-europeanize’ or to place a great -
er global emphasis on subjects that have traditionally been consid-
ered as essentially european.8 The holocaust is certainly one of these.
More and more frequently, scholars are looking beyond its cen tral
geographies, located in the ghettos, concentration and death camps
of eastern europe. And in doing so, they have discovered new and
intriguing avenues of inquiry.9 second, and more specifically, the
topic of Jewish refugees in india has unique features. it incorporates
other categories that intersect with the refugee experience—race and
coloniality, but also a destination that was, at this time, undergoing
its own political convulsions as the indian independence movement
gained momentum. For this reason it has the potential to combine
holocaust history with the history of empire and decolonization.
Yet, as mentioned, writing the history of Jewish exile in india
requires some considerable challenges to be overcome. First, how
does one write authoritatively on a topic that comprises three distinct
aspects, each of which requires its own expertise? (1) nazi policy
towards the Jews and Jews’ attempts to escape the Third reich; (2)
British and British colonial refugee policy towards Jews and late colo-
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8 see Atina Grossmann, ‘remapping relief and rescue: Flight, Displace -
ment, and international Aid for Jewish refugees during World War ii’, New
German Critique, 117 (2012), 61–79, at 61.
9 examples include Tim Cole’s Holocaust Landscapes (London, 2016), and
paolo Giaccaria and Claudio Minca (eds.), Hitler’s Geographies: The Spatialities
of the Third Reich (Chicago, 2016).
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nial administrative policy in British india more generally; and (3) the
history of the indian national independence movement and refugee
policy in india after partition. 
A second, more methodological problem is how to deal with a
topic comprised essentially of multiple case studies without produc-
ing a fragmented history that lacks coherence? There are at least three
perspectives that could profitably be brought to bear when writing
on this topic: first, that of British colonial administrators working in
both Britain and india; second, the Jewish aid organizations involved
with helping the refugees; and, third, the perspectives of the refugees
themselves, which, in turn, could be further stratified by gender, age,
and so on. This article will sketch out some of the approaches histo-
rians could use when engaging with these three groups, and in doing
so, aims to provide some suggestions for future research on this
topic.
i. British Colonial Administrators
Colonial administrators are central to this topic because the fate of
the refugees lay predominantly in their hands. Without realizing it,
British civil servants were faced with a huge moral dilemma when, at
the end of the 1930s, a growing number of Jews from Germany and
Austria sought refuge in the uK and its overseas territories. Admin -
istrators were the first point of contact for prospective refu gees apply-
ing for visas, and successful applicants remained under their author-
ity and surveillance throughout their time in exile. understanding
what lay behind colonial administrators’ attitudes is therefore impor-
tant because these attitudes often shaped policy towards the
refugees.
historian Louise London’s depiction of the relationship between
Jewish refugees and the British metropolitan (that is, non-colonial)
authorities in her book Whitehall and the Jews is exemplary.10 Lon -
don’s thesis is that practical considerations overruled humanitarian
motives in determining whether Jews would be granted exile in
Britain. As i will explore in this section, similar considerations were
also in play for india.
49
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even at an institutional level, the indian colonial state did not
function as a single unit. Authority over decision-making was split
between the Government of india, based in new Delhi, and the india
office, based in Whitehall. While the Government of india enjoyed
sub stantial autonomy over social and economic matters in india, its
decisions were still held to account, and sometimes actively deter-
mined, by the india office, which represented the views of the British
home Government in Westminster. As far as refugees were con-
cerned, the picture that emerges is of administrators at the india
office attempting to persuade the Government of india to adopt some
aspect of policy that had been adopted by the home Government for
Britain, or which had been suggested in parliament for implementa-
tion in the colonies. This became particularly apparent during dis-
cussions aimed at relaxing the criteria for refugees’ admission to
india in late 1938 and early 1939, and again at the beginning of the
second World War, concerning the internment of refugees.11 Yet the
Government of india could, and did, resolutely follow its own path
in crucial aspects of refugee policy, thereby separating the experi-
ences of refugees in india from those of refugees in Britain, and
indeed in other parts of the British empire.
The india office has been described as the ‘home Government of
Britain’s largest and most complex overseas possession’ and as ‘an
imperial government in miniature’.12 it was the first port of call for
refugees applying for visas to india. The records of the india office,
now held at the British Library, are thus of particular significance for
understanding the ways in which these applications were dealt with.
The other key source base for investigating imperial administrators’
attitudes towards refugees seeking refuge in British india are the
records of the Government of india, which are held at the national
Archives of india in new Delhi. These are most revealing for the in -
sights they provide into the ways refugees were dealt with once in
india, including policies such as internment and the suspicions held
against certain refugees, recorded in sometimes extensive case files.
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11 ‘refugees (Government proposals)’, 21 nov. 1938, in BL, ior: L/pJ/7/
2462: ‘765; settlement of Jewish refugees in British Guiana’.
12 The first quotation comes from A. p. Kaminsky, quoted in Anthony Kirk-
Greene, Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966 (Basingstoke, 2000), 31;
the second one comes from Kirk-Greene, ibid.
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Taken together, these documents present a detailed picture of two
colonial institutions, their structural composition and operational
remit, but also the ‘mental universe’—the kinds of assumptions, val-
ues, and attitudes—in which their employees made decisions regard-
ing refugees. As such, it is important not to view refugee policy as
solely the product of institutions, considered as homogeneous enti-
ties, or to assume that these institutions were efficient, smoothly func-
tioning, and harmonious, with clearly defined agendas and goals, in
short, that they always ‘worked’. instead, and as is readily ap parent
when looking at the records of both the india office and the Gov ern -
ment of india, these institutions were composed of different people
with different views—even if they were overwhelmingly of the same
gender and from the same socio-economic and cultural milieu. The
focus, therefore, should not be on colonial institutions but rather on
the individuals who worked for them, the colonial administrators.
This does not, however, imply a purely individual-level approach,
since these administrators had no power without their institutional
affiliation: as officers of the india office or of the Government of
india. They were, therefore, individuals performing within an insti-
tutional context.
While British civil servants held considerable power over the fates
of German-speaking Jews, their attitudes towards them were not
influenced, or at least not directly influenced, by nazi policy and
propaganda. some were evidently sympathetic to the Jews’ plight,
and others considerably less so. The discrepancies in these personal
attitudes, which should have been separate from policy but often did
affect decisions regarding individual refugees, are therefore an
important line of investigation.
in this regard, the lens or lenses through which colonial adminis-
trators viewed the refugees require scrutiny. prospective or actual
refugees could be viewed interchangeably as ‘Jews’, ‘refugees’, ‘Ger -
man nationals’, ‘enemy aliens’, ‘internees’, separately or in combina-
tion. Most often, though, refugees were viewed through a na tional
lens. This was because refugee policy operated, as it still does, with-
in a national legal framework. For example, as we saw in the case of
the schuberts, the distinction between German and Aus trian refu gees
became particularly acute after the nazi annexation (Anschluss) of
Austria in March 1938. ‘German Government intends to cancel all
Austrian passports and to issue German passports in their place’,
51
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stated a telegram sent the following month by the secretary of state
for india to the Government of india. ‘Jews desirous of leaving
Austria may be granted permission but will automatically become
denationalised and not be permitted to return.’13 This created a large
technical obstacle in the government’s refugee policy: a criterion for
applicants was that their passports had to be ‘valid for return’, so that
in the event that they became a burden on the state or involved in
criminal activities, they could be repatriated.14 Austrian Jews were
thus treated differently from German Jews in the visa application
process and, ironically, the nazi annexation of their country made it
more difficult for them to apply for refuge in British territory.
The ‘national’ categorization of Jewish refugees manifested itself
most acutely for those who successfully managed to escape to india
but were then, upon the outbreak of war, suspected either of being
nazis or of having nazi sympathies. A case in point is the doctor
hans hahndel, who arrived in india from Germany in 1936 and set
up a practice in Calcutta. Like all male German and Austrian nation-
als over the age of 16, hahndel was interned in september 1939, a
policy that was much stricter than in Britain, where internment was
not introduced until May 1940, implemented hesitantly, and even
then applied only to a minority of refugees.15 initially, Jewish refu -
gees in india were held, together with their compatriots, in makeshift
internment camps—a policy that generated strong criticism from the
Jewish aid agencies involved with the refugees. Consequently, the
British authorities set up an Aliens Advisory Committee, also known
as the Darling Commission after its leader sir Malcolm Darling, to
investigate the political backgrounds and affiliations of internees on
a case-by-case basis. The commission resulted in the release of most,
but not all, Jewish refugees. hahndel was one of the unlucky ones.
The records of the Aliens Advisory Committee, now held at the
national Archives of india, show that hahndel generated an ex -
tremely large case file, based on his having been a member of the
German Club in Calcutta. German Clubs were networking associa-
tions for German nationals that existed around the world. however,
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14 BL, ior: L/pJ/7/2138.
15 London, Whitehall and the Jews, 170.
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some of the members of the Calcutta club were suspected of having
nazi sympathies. Worse still, hahndel had treated a patient for
appendicitis who later turned out to be a nazi. For these two reasons
his release from detention was delayed until July 1942.16
The seemingly illogical internment policy for German-speaking
Jews in india, and the very real and deleterious effects it could have
on them, requires explanation. Why did the British colonial authori-
ties not simply, and from the outset, differentiate between Jews and
non-Jews, since the former were only in india as a result of being per-
secuted by the nazis, and thus surely would not in any way support
them? First of all, in the eyes of civil servants working for the Gov -
ern ment of india at the outbreak of hostilities with nazi Germany,
the fear of nazi infiltration was very real. A number of articles which
appeared in the Bombay Sentinel, an english-language daily, in July
1938 claimed to expose the activities of a nazi spy ring operating out
of Bombay, led by a Dr oswald urchs (who allegedly styled himself
as ‘Landesgruppen-Führer’ for south Asia). in addition to conduct-
ing espionage, they were alleged to be spreading pro-nazi propa-
ganda, including placing pressure on German-owned firms in india
to dismiss their Jewish staff and appealing to indians that they were
also members of the Aryan race. These reports clearly reached the
attention of British politicians, resulting in a question raised in par-
liament in november 1938, asking the under-secretary of state for
india ‘whether he is aware of the activities of foreign political parties
in india; and what steps he is taking to counteract this propaganda’.
The reply, drafted by Aubrey Dibdin of the india office, indicated
that they had recently heard ‘of the printing in india of a paper enti-
tled “Der Deutsche in indien”’, which was ‘almost certainly the offi-
cial organ of the nazi Ausland organisation’. however, the reply
concluded: ‘hitherto we have had no reason to suppose that nazi
activities in india are achieving any great measure of success.’17
The wider picture was that india was a vulnerable outpost of the
British empire. Territorially it was massive, and it was governed by
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16 national Archives of india, home political: eW/1939/nA/F-21-54-xLix
(pr_000003011002): ‘exemption from internment of Dr. hans Fritz hahndel’;
e/1940/nA/F-17-298 (pr_000003010072): ‘Application for Grant of a Visa
for india to Mrs. Gertrud hahndel.’
17 BL, ior: L/pJ/7/2286: ‘5539; nazi propaganda in india.’
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a relatively tiny number of colonial administrators. There were al -
most certainly some pro-nazi Germans residing in india, and it
seems likely that at least a small number were active agents. At any
rate, the fear of the nazi infiltrator was very much set in the mind of
the British colonial administrator and it determined, to a large extent,
the draconian internment policy instituted for all German and Aus -
trian nationals in september 1939. The final factor in this matrix, and
one that is often overlooked with hindsight, is that German-speaking
Jews were indistinguishable from non-Jewish Germans in appear-
ance, behaviour, and cultural habits. Their political opinions, legal
status, and reasons for residing in india may have been different, but
to the eyes of the British administrator they were in every way as
‘German’ as their supposedly ‘Aryan’ counterparts.
That said, there are a number of instances where British colonial
personnel clearly viewed and, in turn treated, Jewish refugees as
Jews. in a heavily annotated document from February 1939 outlining
the Government of india’s new visa policy for ‘foreign refugee appli-
cants’, one india office administrator inserted an asterisk after the
line ‘As regards the admission of Jewish refugees’, writing in the mar-
gin: ‘i don’t follow why they are treated separately—and apparently
better—(“moral considerations” not excluded!) than others. surely
the policy should be the same to all, except that Woburn house [the
headquarters of the Council for German Jewry] will not guarantee the
Aryans?’ A full seven years later, in a correspondence between the
india office, the Government of india, the Jewish relief Association,
and the World Jewish Congress concerning proposals forcibly to repa-
triate Jewish refugees still interned in india, r. n. Gilchrist of the
india office wrote in what appears to be an internal memo:
The plain truth is that the majority of Jews [still interned] are
persons with ‘records’—suspected German spies, forgers and
petty international crooks . . . They are of a class of person who
normally would be deported by any country, whatever their
race. Mr. easterman [the World Jewish Congress representa-
tive] must be misinformed about the character of these people,
otherwise he could hardly have used the phrase . . . that they
are persons who have a right to determine the place where
they may find peace and security. it would, however, be nei-
ther kind nor politic to tell him the real truth. hence i have
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suggested that if he wishes to pursue the matter he may
arrange for a discussion with me when i can convey the neces-
sary hints about the character of these people.18
such comments provide only the merest glimpse—the tip, one im -
agines, of a veritable iceberg—of British colonial administrators’ atti-
tudes towards Jews. Yet in order to better understand the patterns of
thought that lay behind such comments, it would be necessary to sit-
uate them within a broader cultural context (a task that cannot be
achieved in the space of this article). What sorts of ideas and beliefs
about Jews would these administrators have grown up with and,
later, encountered in their social and professional lives? These can be
deduced, at least in part, from the existing literature on the relation-
ship between Jews and modern Britain.19
easier to discern are the ways in which geo-political concerns
influenced administrators’ attitudes towards Jewish refugees. Colon -
ial personnel would almost certainly have been trained in this area,
particularly regarding the significance of, and indigenous opposition
towards, Jews and Jewish settlement in the British protectorate of
palestine. This was only a minor issue in the case of British india,
although, as Margit Franz has pointed out, both of the major political
parties in late colonial india—the indian national Congress and the
Muslim League—adopted an anti-Zionist stance.20 however, in some
of the territorial outposts of British india, such as the protectorate of
Aden on the Arabian peninsula, the issue was far more pertinent.
Although Aden was detached from British india and became a
separate colony in 1937, documents surrounding the settlement of
Jewish refugees there were still being handled by the india office in
1939. This particularly concerned the island of socotra, a province of
the Aden protectorate, which had been mooted by Conservative
politician and former Colonial secretary Leo Amery as a possible des -
tin ation for Jewish refugees. A letter sent by John evelyn shuckburgh
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19 examples include David Feldman, Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and
Political Culture, 1840–1914 (new haven, 1994), and susanne Terwey, Moder -
ner Antisemitismus in Großbritannien, 1899–1919: Über die Funktion von Vorur -
teilen sowie Einwanderung und nationale Identität (Würzburg, 2006).
20 Franz, Gateway India, 56–7.
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of the Colonial office in Downing street to sir Bernard reilly, the
Governor of Aden, in March 1939 outlined some of the objections to
this plan. The first, that the climate ‘would not suit people accus-
tomed to european conditions’ seems improbable given that, earlier
in the letter, shuckburgh had raised india and northern rhodesia as
feasible destinations for ‘small groups’ of refugees. The second had
to do with objections from the local population: the island, shuck -
burgh pointed out, ‘was ruled by an Arab sultan, who had enjoyed
our protection for some fifty years’, and ‘any talk of introducing
Jewish refugees in large numbers into his territory would at once
raise the cry that yet another Arab country was being handed over to
the Jews’. Yet, shuckburgh concluded, ‘the situation has become so
desperate’ that a ‘limited settlement’ of Jews in socotra—of around
1,000 families or 5,000 individuals—should be considered.21
reilly’s initial response stated that ‘The introduction of Jews into
the island would be very unwelcome to the inhabitants’ and ‘would
be certain to rouse violent protests’ since it would be seen ‘as an
attempt to reproduce in southern Arabia the policy that has already
caused such bitter controversy in palestine’. The official response, sent
by W. h. ingrams, British resident Advisor for the Aden pro tect orate,
on 15 April, put a definitive kibosh on the proposal. ‘soqotra on top
of palestine would about finish us with the rest of the Arabs’, ingrams
wrote. he related to shuckburgh that he had attended lunch with
‘h.h.’ (presumably the sultan) the previous day and had ‘raised the
question of the Jews’. ‘i think he had a genuine sympathy with their
plight’, ingrams wrote. ‘he said if only they were Christians and not
Jews there would be no real trouble.’22
The matter might have ended there, but what followed was a
quite remarkable exchange, in which the British authorities’ (largely
strategic) concerns about Jewish settlement took on a different
dimension. on 22 April the india office’s political secretary sent an
encrypted telegram to the residency at Mukalla (the administrative
centre of Aden’s eastern protectorate), fervently denying a rumour
that the British authorities were planning to settle 70,000 Jews in the
protectorate. Three days later reilly wrote to shuckburgh stating that
they were ‘taking steps to deny it categorically’ and also ‘trying to
56
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22 ibid.
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discover how it can have originated’, with the implication that it was
a ‘calculated . . . form of anti-British propaganda’.23
But the matter was clearly now beyond their control. on 6 May
the residency received a letter, handwritten in Arabic, from sultan
Ja’far bin Mansur, one of the regional rulers in the protectorate. ‘i
have been informed’, the attached translation read, ‘that rumours
have been circulating about the possibility of settling 70,000 Jews
between seiyun and Tarim’ (two cities in Aden). ‘it hardly seems nec-
essary to deny such a ridiculous story’, the letter continued, ‘but i
shall be glad if you will let it be known that h.M.G. has no intention
whatsoever of bringing Jewish immigrants.’ At this point, British
administrators went silent on the issue, neglecting to mention that
the rumour was essentially a numerical exaggeration of a quite seri-
ous proposal that had originated in Downing street the previous
month. on 18 May sultan Ja’far published a notice officially denying
the ‘false rumours’. The covering note to the draft copy, written by a
British official, now described them as ‘Jewish propaganda’.24
After war broke out in september 1939 the British colonial author-
ities in London and new Delhi tended increasingly to categorize
German-speaking Jewish refugees in ways other than their national-
ity or religious background. They became, like all other German
nationals in india, ‘enemy aliens’. Males over the age of 16 addition-
ally became ‘internees’. in 1940, following an india office policy in
which the details of all German nationals still interned would be
passed on to the nazi government, the Jews among them unofficial-
ly became ‘internees unwilling to have their names communicated to
the German government’.25 As one, Muhammad Asad, a convert to
islam born Leopold Weiss, explained sardonically in a note to the
authorities, ‘i herewith declare that i do not wish any further partic-
ulars about me to be sent to the German Government. i was Austrian
till 1938, and i do not recognise the nazi Government nor, by the
way, any German Government whatever. i will have nothing to do




25 BL, ior: L/pJ/8/30A: ‘Coll. 101/10A; Treatment of Aliens, prisoners of
War and Civilian internees in india.’
26 handwritten note signed ‘M. Asad-Weiss’ dated 24 Apr. 1940, in BL, ior:
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Colonial officials also developed a sliding scale, ranging from
xxxx (‘strong and still convinced nazis’) to x (‘anti-nazi’), although
it appears only to have been used sporadically, appearing as an addi-
tional ‘security note’ on some of the nominal rolls for internees and
parolees.27 it was, in effect, another way of distinguishing between
Jewish and non-Jewish inmates, since, while there were a handful of
‘anti-nazi’ non-Jewish Germans in india, as india office official
Gilchrist pointed out in a memo from 1944, ‘The non-nazis of course
are practically all Jews’.28
Yet the colonial authorities not only used political terminology to
categorize internees; they routinely used nazi racial terminology—
‘Aryan’ and ‘non-Aryan’—specifically to differentiate between Jew ish
and non-Jewish Germans. While undoubtedly an affront to present-
day sensibilities, in the early 1940s, when these terms had not yet
been fully contaminated by the horrors of the holocaust, adopting
the categorization used by the polity of which these individuals were
subjects seemed to make sense, especially when communicating with
that polity. Furthermore, Britain had not gone to war with Germany
on the basis of its government’s ideas about race, and colonial admin-
istrators were also used to working with such ethnic categorizations
in their dealings with the populations they governed. As such, in -
stances of the term ‘German Aryan’, which appear frequently on the
nominal rolls,29 or, to take an individual example, that hans hahn -
del’s continued detention was based on his association with ‘Ger mans
(Aryans)’, should not be seen as evidence that the British authorities
agreed with nazi ideology, but rather that they were willing to use
nazi terminology in their dealings with Jews.30
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ii. Jewish Aid Organizations
Jewish aid organizations played an important role in determining
both refugee policy and how refugees were treated once in india.
Like the colonial authorities, they were also institutional bodies, but
there the similarity ends. They were much smaller, had been created
more recently, and had no larger political body sitting behind them
to bestow legitimacy on them. They were looser, more informal ar -
rangements, often built around the initiative of a single individual or
group of individuals. And their remit was, of course, much more lim-
ited: to help european Jews fleeing nazi persecution to find refuge,
and to protect and support them in their place of refuge.
This section has two objectives. First, it aims to show how the two
main Jewish relief organizations involved with refugees in india
positioned themselves within the political and administrative frame-
work created by the colonial authorities, and the strategies they used
within this framework to exert pressure on the authorities. second, it
explores the goals these aid organizations pursued that went beyond
purely humanitarian aid.
The two main aid organizations involved in helping Jewish
refugees in india were the Council for German Jewry, based in
London, and the Jewish relief Association, based in Bombay (and
later with branches in Calcutta and Madras). The Council for German
Jewry was created in 1936 by senior Anglo-Jewish leaders to help
German Jews find refuge in various destinations around the world.31
The Jewish relief Association was set up two years earlier in Bombay
by eleven mostly european Jews as a ‘purely charitable association to
assist european Jews who found their way to hospitable india but
had no means of livelihood’.32 initially its role was limited, but from
1938, as the refugee crisis deepened, it became increasingly connect-
ed with the Council for German Jewry.
it is even more important to investigate the backgrounds, atti-
tudes, and motives of the individuals who comprised the Jewish aid
organizations than it is for colonial authorities. This is because indi-
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Cronin Article_Article template (footnotes).qxd  08.08.2019  12:21  Page 59
viduals had much greater power and autonomy within the (much
smaller) aid organizations than they did within governmental insti-
tutions. understanding who these men were, in a social sense, in
terms of their nationality and class status, helps to explain not only
why they acted as they did, but also how effectively they were able to
act; in other words, the extent to which they could successfully place
pressure on state or colonial authorities.
The personnel of both aid organizations under discussion are
illustrative in this regard. Despite being based in india, the Jewish
relief Association was, as mentioned, set up primarily by european
Jews. out of india’s three Jewish communities—the Cochin Jews, the
Bene israel, and the so-called ‘Baghdadi’ Jews—two were not repre-
sented at all. The small Cochin Jewish community, as their name sug-
gests, was based almost exclusively on the Malabar coast in south-
western india, and therefore unlikely to come into contact with the
Jewish relief Association, which operated out of india’s major port
cities. however, the Bene israel, india’s largest Jewish community,
was also not represented; the most probable reason for this was their
low socio-economic status and consequent lack of cultural capital.33
By contrast, the ‘Baghdadi’ Jews, who arrived in india from iraq,
iran, and syria in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were
often wealthy, based in urban centres, and connected to the British
colonial elites.34 it is unsurprising therefore that the Jewish relief
Association’s two figurehead leaders, sir David and sir Alwyn ezra,
came from a prominent Calcutta-based, Baghdadi-Jewish family.
They were chosen, according to historian Joan roland, to bestow
‘pres tige’ on the fledgling organization.35
For its part, the Council for German Jewry (renamed the Central
Council for Jewish refugees during wartime) was an entirely english
affair. its board members were drawn from the upper echelons of
Anglo-Jewry, and its key player, norman Bentwich, was a prominent
barrister who had himself held senior positions in British colonial
administration, including as Attorney-General of palestine. Cru cial -
ly, therefore, he had close relationships with high-ranking govern-
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34 roland, Jewish Communities, 178.
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ment personnel, including in the india office.36 At a time before non-
governmental organizations and an established international legal
framework for dealing with refugees, such connections, and the ‘back -
room diplomacy’ they entailed, were crucial. Files from the india of -
fice records reveal Bentwich’s instrumental role in pressuring the
colonial authorities to relax the criteria for Jewish refugees wishing to
obtain visas for india. how he was able to do this requires a brief
explanation of the historical context.
Following the Visa Abolition Agreement in 1927, German and
Austrian nationals did not require a visa to enter Britain or its over-
seas territories. however, the nazi annexation of Austria in March
1938, which resulted in a steep rise in the number of Austrian Jews
entering the uK, caused the British government to cancel the agree-
ment almost immediately. This necessitated new admission criteria
to regulate the influx of German and Austrian nationals to Britain
and its colonies. The Government of india in new Delhi was respon-
sible for determining the criteria for obtaining a visa for india, which
they announced in May 1938. initially, these were extremely restric-
tive, more so than for Britain itself: applicants had to provide a finan-
cial guarantee, an offer of employment, character references, and
some form of evidence to suggest that they were ‘not politically
undesirable’ (usually this came in the form of a statement to the effect
that they were ‘not interested in politics’).37 inevitably, this meant
that many applications were rejected on the basis of small technical-
ities and the majority of those who were able to secure visas were
well-educated and financially secure individuals with pre-existing
contacts in india. indeed, as historian Joachim oesterheld has shown,
between January 1938 and February 1939 (when the criteria were
modified), the Government of india sanctioned just 269 visas for
Jewish refugees.38
several months elapsed before it became clear to the Council for
German Jewry just how many potential refugees the entrance criteria
were excluding. Following the state-orchestrated pogrom (Reichs -
kristallnacht) on 9 november 1938, and a subsequent surge in appli-
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cations for refuge from both German and Austrian Jews, the Council
for German Jewry started to exert pressure on the colonial authori-
ties. it is unclear how this process began, but it appears that, soon
after the pogrom, the Council’s leader, norman Bentwich, made an
appeal to the india League (the uK branch of the indian national
Congress) asking them to look into ways of alleviating the restric-
tions for entry to india.39 Congress leaders Mahatma Gandhi and
Jawaharlal nehru had already expressed their desire for india to take
in more persecuted Jews, not least because of the technical skills they
could offer to the developing country.40 When the india office heard
about this appeal, and the positive response Bentwich had received,
they became concerned that the refugee issue would be used by
Congress as a means of discrediting the British. As a result, they
swiftly invited norman Bentwich to discuss the situation.41 Aubrey
Dibdin explained the situation in a letter to the Government of india
in December 1938 as follows:
Distinguished members of the Jewish community in London
approached the india office with particular reference to a
Committee in London run by the india League. We advised
them that this Committee was not of the kind we should
advise them to deal with and as a necessary corollary offered
to see the representatives of the Council. it seems inadvisable
in present conditions to give any ground for allegations that
our visa conditions are acting as a bar against chances in india
for individual refugees which Congress and the [indian prince -
ly] states are otherwise prepared to favour.42
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41 Voigt, ‘Die emigration von Juden’, 92.
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Bentwich’s solution was that the Council for German Jewry should
act as an affidavit agency. prospective refugees would send their visa
applications direct to the Council and, if deemed suitable, the Coun -
cil would agree to support them financially. Meanwhile, the Jewish
relief Association in india would search for employment opportuni-
ties for the incoming refugees. While the india office quickly agreed
to the proposals, the Government of india was at first unwilling to
drop its stipulation that refugees obtain an offer of employment
before they arrived in india. After several weeks of negotiations, in
which the india office clearly placed pressure on the Government of
india, the latter dropped this requirement, and on 13 January the
india office informed Bentwich of the new criteria: the Council for
German Jewry would henceforth provide affidavits and a financial
guarantee for all refugees. The only concession to the Government of
india’s reservations was that this guarantee would last for a maxi-
mum of five years. if, at this point, a refugee had not found employ-
ment, he or she would be sent back—to Britain, at least, and not their
country of origin—at the Council’s expense.43
Without question, the new and less restrictive procedure for
refugees’ entry into india would not have come about had it not been
for the intervention of the Council for German Jewry and, in particu-
lar, its influential leader, norman Bentwich. While the responsibility
for refugees switched to the Jewish relief Association upon arrival in
india, this organization still relied on its more powerful London
counterpart to place pressure on the British authorities when needed.
For instance, in July 1940 the Jewish relief Association’s Calcutta
branch sent a telegram direct to norman Bentwich, informing him
that Jewish refugees in Calcutta were about to be re-interned. ‘sug -
gest immediate representations be made either to the secretary for
india or by parliamentary questions for indian government to be
directed to follow english policy’, it stated.44 The telegram had its in -
tended effect as, two weeks later, the League of nation’s high Com -
missioner for refugees, herbert emerson, wrote to the Government
of india, with reference to the telegram, advising them to adopt, or at
least be cognizant of, the policy towards internees in Great Britain.
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‘The measures of internment adopted by the British Government’,
emerson explained, ‘were precautionary in the interests of public
security, and they were not intended to reflect on the reliability or
loyalty to this country of the great majority.’ even the india office
now distanced itself from the Government of india’s hardening
approach towards refugees (which was in part informed by the fear
of a Japanese invasion), explaining in a telegram to the League of
nations some days later that they had ‘urged on the G/i the impor-
tance . . . of bringing their policy into line with policy here’ and
agreed that the Government of india would now have to ‘justify why
its policy differs from that of the British Government’.45
While government authorities were their most important stake-
holders, the Jewish aid organizations also operated within a multi-
nodal, international network of Jewish relief. As the above example
illustrates, close co-operation within this network was an essential
component of driving change at policy level. however, this was not
the aid agencies’ sole remit. The maintenance of Jewish religious life
in exile destinations, for example, which was a matter of no concern
to state authorities, was a priority for at least some of the individuals
who worked for the agencies. The spatial concentration of a specific
number of Jews, often, as in the case of india, confined primarily to
major cities, whose details were all on record and who were, more-
over, reliant to a large degree on the aid agencies, provided the
opportunity—something of a ‘captive audience’—for functionaries of
these agencies to impose, or at least try to impose, their vision of a
Jewish life on the refugees. establishing their motivations for doing
this would require one to look at individual biographies. however,
one supposes that their work for these agencies, being voluntary in
nature, was informed by a sense of mission that went beyond a mere-
ly philanthropic desire to help fellow Jews in distress.
A case in point is that of hanns reissner, a Berlin-born historian
who emigrated to india in october 1939 as a refugee but also, it
appears, to work for the Jewish relief Association, since he immedi-
ately became its secretary. (This also highlights the importance of
pre-existing connections in the formation of and interactions between
the different aid agencies.) on 29 December he wrote to neville
Laski, a prominent leader of Anglo-Jewry and Chairman of the Board
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of Deputies of British Jews, informing him of the activities of the
Jewish relief Association in india. But reissner also wanted Laski’s
advice and assistance. he was concerned about the low level of reli-
gious observance, not only amongst the refugees but also within the
two local Jewish communities, the Bene israel and the Baghdadi Jews.
‘i know that both the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish As so -
ci ation did much for the upkeep of Judaism as a religious and social
community of self-esteem . . . in remote quarters of the British
empire’, he wrote to Laski. ‘i wonder whether your friends would be
inclined to contemplate the sending out of a young rabbi to Bombay
as except lower ministers like hasanim, shohtim etc., there is nothing
at all to be found in Bombay at present.’ such a rabbi, reissner noted,
would ‘unfortunately’ have to be paid for by the London authorities
‘as the Bombay trustees might be of the opinion that they could not
afford to pay his salary’. nonetheless, the Jewish community of
Bombay, comprising a total of around 9,210 persons, including 480
refugees, ‘deserves a spiritual shepherd’. ‘i am sorry to say’, reissner
concluded, that the refugees ‘are very bad Jews to a certain percent-
age, full of self-deception and lacking decency to a large extent.’
however, what reissner meant by this is unclear, and the comment
seems particularly unusual given that the majority of the refugees
were drawn from reissner’s own milieu of acculturated German-
speaking Jews. if these Jews were lacking religiously, as they might
have appeared to a Jew from eastern europe, for example, then sure-
ly this would not have come as a surprise to him. reissner noted
revealingly that he was making the request ‘not in my official capac-
ity as a secretary of the Jewish relief Association but in my private
capacity of a Jew and contemporary’.46 What he meant by the word
‘Jew’ was clearly imbued with a particular content, one that he felt
was lacking in the Jews living in india.
The two major press outlets for indian Jewry, the Jewish Tribune
and the Jewish Advocate, both had close relationships with the Jewish
relief Association and served as mouthpieces for its activities. in par-
ticular, the two newspapers were instrumental in publicizing fund-
ing drives for the refugees, reminding their readers that responsibil-
ity for the refugees’ welfare fell primarily on their shoulders.47 As
much as these appeals were philanthropically motivated, the news-
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Cronin Article_Article template (footnotes).qxd  08.08.2019  12:21  Page 65
papers also had political agendas, and these could be used to add an
additional layer of meaning to requests for donations.48 For instance,
in July 1939 the Advocate reported on a meeting held at Calcutta’s
Judean Club, ‘with the object of inaugurating a drive to collect funds
for the Jewish refugees in Calcutta’. The audience were first given a
‘harrowing account of the treatment the refugees received’ prior to
leaving their homes (the principal reason to donate). This was fol-
lowed by an address by an e. J. samuel, who explained that ‘in the
early days of Zionism . . . there were many of our race who did not
care to give the movement a thought, feeling that as they were well-
off in the countries of their birth and domicile, there was no occasion
for their troubling themselves over this movement’, an attitude
which samuel described as ‘selfish’. ‘The Jews in Germany and Cen -
tral europe, particularly’, he continued, ‘were indifferent to this
movement, in fact, antagonistic to it, while today, they, more than
anybody else, are the ones who are in direct need of the protection
and assistance of Zionism.’ As such, samuel concluded, the refugees
were ‘potential ambassadors for a great cause’.49 A secondary reason
for donating therefore becomes clear—by helping the refugees,
indian Jews were also helping the Zionist cause. The subtext of this,
however, was that the refugees, in their vulnerable state, could be
refashioned from outside. Their arrival in india was therefore con-
sidered, by some, as a political opportunity, and it is difficult not to
get the impression from samuel’s statement that they were being
instrumentalized.
The above examples serve to illustrate that, for the Jewish aid
organizations, the boundaries between institutional and personal
action were always liminal, and that institutional authority had a
strong basis in the personal authority of the individuals who com-
prised them. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, this
means that a biographical focus is even more important for under-
standing the motives of the agencies than of the colonial authorities,
which had a more developed, complex, and rigid organizational
structure that limited the extent to which their agents could act inde-
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pendently. ultimately, though, this disparity meant that the (in -
formally organized and individually driven) aid organizations could
exert at least some pressure on the (much larger and more powerful)
state authorities, since they were not bound by convention and
bureaucratic procedure. The aid agencies could thus make decisions
and take action quickly, in response to changes in the political climate
or the situation of the refugees for whom they took responsibility.
iii. The Refugee Experience
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the pitfalls of writing on
this topic is a lack of analytical cohesion. This is most pronounced
when taking the perspective of the refugees themselves, since they
were often connected to each other only by the fact that they defined
themselves (or had been defined by the nazis) as Jewish, and had
been persecuted and forced into exile for that reason. Consequently, it
can be difficult for scholars studying this group of refugees to find a
unifying framework to bring them together without resorting to the
state authorities and/or Jewish aid organizations that dealt with
them. here i will sketch a few possible approaches that could be
applied.
The refugees were, as mentioned, connected by the experience of
being persecuted by the nazis and subsequently having to escape
their home countries, leading to the experience of being refugees. Yet
a third and more unusual factor connecting them was that they had
ended up in a particular geographic location: india. While some of
the early wave of refugees (until late 1938), had pre-existing contacts
in india, for the majority, their encounter with india would have been
unthinkable even a few years before. it would therefore be fruitful to
consider what position india (or perhaps ‘the orient’) occupied in the
minds of German-speaking Jews by examining the kinds of cultural
products about india—including literature, art, and music—that
were available in Germany and Austria in the 1920s and 1930s. These
would provide an impression of the ‘imaginary’ about india these
refugees took with them, and from there, one might be able to
deduce, by examining their later writings and artistic works, how
these understandings were altered as a result of their lived experi-
ences in india.
67
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While this is undoubtedly rich terrain, it does lead to the problem,
common in refugee studies, of over representing intellectuals and
creative types. individuals drawn from creative milieux were pro-
portionately well-represented in the indian refugee cohort, but they
were still numerically insignificant compared to the doctors, engi-
neers, and other technical professionals who comprised the majority.
These groups were much less likely to produce creative material of
artistic value—whether writings, visual art, or music—for the histo-
rian to analyse. so, while such work can provide a fascinating
insight into the ways a particular subset of refugees perceived and
then represented india, one must also bear in mind that they were a
minority, and that the British and indian authorities preferred tech-
nical professionals to come to india over artists and creative types.
The fact that this latter group was so well represented, despite there
being relatively few opportunities in the creative fields in india,
appears to have been due, in many cases, to their having independ-
ent means.
That said, the experiences and perceptions of india of the non-
artistic majority of the refugees are by no means impenetrable. Many
would have written letters to family members and friends in europe
and other exile destinations. These, however, may not have survived,
and tracking them down requires one to find their families. if such
contact has been made, then there is also the possibility to conduct
oral history: speaking to the children of the refugees in order to gain
an impression, less perhaps of how india was experienced by the
refugees, but of how it was remembered, post-exile, in that particular
family.
Jewish refugees occupied a unique position within colonial india.
Although they were visibly white and european, indians are unlike-
ly to have confused them with British colonial personnel because of
linguistic and cultural differences. This does, however, raise the
question of how indians did perceive them, and more broadly, how
the refugees ‘fit’ into the constellation of colonialism and racism that
existed in india at the time. Aside from the pronouncements of lead-
ing indian nationalist politicians, the only indian voices that can be
brought to bear in this regard are the letters sent to Jewish and met-
ropolitan newspapers (the latter often reprinted in the former) which
expressed, almost without exception, sympathy for the refugees’
plight, and called on india (that is, the British authorities) to do more
68
Cronin Article_Article template (footnotes).qxd  08.08.2019  12:21  Page 68
to help them.50 Yet this brings us back to the problem that only well-
educated indians were able to write to such newspapers. The opin-
ions of the vast majority of indians are more difficult to ascertain,
since, at this time, 83.9 per cent of indians (75.1 per cent of males and
92.7 per cent of females) were illiterate and, as such, could produce
no written documents of their own.51
As shalva Weil remarks, ‘most indians were simply ignorant of
the arrival of hundreds of Jews to india before and during the second
World War’.52 This, combined with a relative absence of documenta-
tion illustrating indians’ attitudes towards Jewish refugees, raises the
risk of substituting the opinions of a few vocal and high-profile in -
dians for that of the entire population. one example is the indian
nationalist politician subhas Chandra Bose, a Germanophile who
had at least some sympathy for the nazis’ revanchist nationalism. in
1939 he claimed that his Congress party colleague Jawaharlal nehru
was ‘seeking to make india an asylum for the Jews’.53 Yet even Bose
ultimately became disenchanted with the nazi movement because of
its crass racism.54 in a different way, the opposition of some indian
doctors towards the right of German-educated doctors to practise in
india (the so-called ‘Doctors problem’ of the mid 1930s) can more
realistically be attributed to concern for their professional livelihood
than to any fear of a ‘Jewish threat’.55
Conversely, evidence of Jewish refugees’ attitudes towards in -
dians are also difficult to come by. if refugees held racist attitudes, for
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instance, they were usually too astute to express them publicly, per-
haps because they had just fled an environment of rampant racism
and had witnessed its consequences. however, private correspon-
dence, a form of communication much more readily available to
refugees than to indians, reveals a more complex picture.56 For dif-
ferent reasons, it is also difficult to determine how refugees perceived
British rule in india. First of all, they were a heterogeneous group,
and presumably held a range of political opinions. But more impor-
tantly, applicants for indian visas had to be able to provide evidence
that they were ‘not politically undesirable’. As such, refugees tended
not to criticize British colonialism publicly until after they had left
india. in her memoirs, Viennese physician eva ungár, who lived in
india between 1938 and 1949, wrote of india ‘throw[ing] off the
english yoke without the use of arms’.57 she attributed the bloody
aftermath of partition to ‘the english’ employing ‘the old and dread-
ful, but tried and tested method of “Divide et impera”’.58 it is unclear,
how ever, whether ungár already opposed British rule in india prior
to her emigration, or whether it developed as a result of her experi-
ences there.
sentiments expressed whilst in exile tended in the opposite direc-
tion (that is, in favour of British rule), although ulterior motives fre-
quently lay behind declarations of support for the British empire.
rudolf Cohn (later Cole), a young dentist in Bombay, offered to join
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the British armed forces in november 1940, writing ‘i am a Jewish
refugee from Germany and i make this offer entirely voluntarily
from a desire to give practical proof of my gratitude to the British
empire and my wish to assist it in the present struggle’. Yet this has
to be read in the context of his being placed under suspicion by the
Aliens Advisory Committee for his contacts with two alleged nazis.59
Kurt Larisch was another refugee whose continued detention in a
parole centre had been recommended for the simple reason that the
story of his escape from nazi Germany via holland and palestine
‘[did] not ring true’ to the British authorities. he wrote to the Deputy
Commissioner of police in Calcutta in october 1940 that: ‘i have
always been . . . with the entire British empire’, although he immedi-
ately qualified this with, ‘in its aim to completely destroy and anni-
hilate perhaps the greatest evil force the world has ever known’.60
however different the refugees may have been from each other,
one thing they all shared in common was that they had moved from
an environment marked by stark class distinctions into one in which
their social class status was less significant, but other categories of
difference—as Jews, as German speakers, as europeans, white peo-
ple, or as refugees—became more visible. This ‘everyday otherness’,
an otherness that was both visible and invisible and composed of
multiple factors, profoundly affected how refugees related to their
environment and, of course, also how people within that environ-
ment related to them.61 Anita Desai’s 1988 novel Baumgartner’s Bom -
bay, about a German-Jewish refugee in wartime india, perfectly cap-
tures this sense of dislocation, alienation, and cultural estrangement,
as the protagonist hugo Baumgartner attempts to deal with his loss
of wealth and status whilst coming to terms with his new, ascribed
status as an ‘enemy alien’ (by the British) and as a firanghi, a term
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59 nAi, home political: eW/1940/nA/F-72-1-24/part-1 (pr_000003011452):
‘recommendation of the Aliens Advisory Committee: Decision that rudolf
Cohn, alias Cole, German Jew, should be Allowed to Continue at Liberty.’
60 nAi, home political: eW/1940/nA/F-72-3-51 (pr_000003011133):
‘recom mendation of the A.A.C. Bengal: Case no. 51 Larisch Mr. K. and Wife.’
61 The term was coined by David radford. see id.: ‘“everyday otherness”:
intercultural refugee encounters and everyday Multiculturalism in a south
Australian rural Town’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42/13 (2016),
2128–45.
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used in both hindi and urdu to mean a white-skinned foreigner, by
his indian neighbours.62
Yet the experience of an identity unmoored and in flux may have
provided an opportunity for some refugees to ‘escape’ the back-
grounds from which they came and to forge new lives for them-
selves. This appears to have been the case particularly for women, to
whom Franz devotes a chapter of her book Gateway India.63 The pic-
ture is a mixed one: on the one hand, the percentage of professional
women in the refugee cohort was higher than it was for Jewish
women in Germany and Austria. (This discrepancy was most likely
caused by their relative youth, combined with the criteria needed to
obtain an indian visa.) Yet it is unclear how many of these women
were able to find jobs corresponding to their training and expertise,
and studies have shown that refugee women are more likely to take
employment below their level of education, skills, and experience
than their male counterparts.64
Gender also appears to have played a role in the ways the author-
ities responded to certain forms of activity refugees engaged in, even
if these were explicitly in support of the British war effort. elisabeth
Dank, an Austrian anthroposophist and writer, was placed under
surveillance by the political Department in simla (where she was
residing) as a result of a letter she wrote to them on 4 August 1939 in
which she offered to ‘help . . . in case of war . . . by lecturing and
broadcasting on england [or] by doing social work’. her case file also
contains a rare documented case of antisemitism from a British colo-
nial official: ‘she is an extremely verbose person’, the official wrote in
a memo after meeting her, ‘and her appearance is most unprepos-
sessing. she is undoubtedly a Jewess by race, if not by religion, and
seems to belong more to the Baghdadi than to the european type of
Jew.’65 similar offers of help from male refugees, such as the exam-
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62 Anita Desai, Baumgartner’s Bombay (London, 1988).
63 Franz, Gateway India, 209–37.
64 see e.g. Melinda suto, ‘Compromised Careers: The occupational Transition
of immigration and resettlement’, Work: A Journal of Prevention, Assessment
and Rehabilitation 32/4 (2009), 417–29. This finding has also been borne out in
my own research on Jewish ‘quota refugees’ in Germany in the 1990s and
2000s.
65 BL, ior: r/2/765/220: ‘File 104/39; Mrs. elisabeth Dank an Austrian
subject.’
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ples of rudolf Cohn and Kurt Larisch mentioned above, resulted in
no such investigations.
A final approach, and one that might at first appear counter-intu-
itive, is to investigate the fates of applicants who were not successful
in securing a visa for india. The existing literature has focused,
understandably, on those who were able to reach india, either by
securing a visa or by other means. however, as was demonstrated in
section ii, the initial visa requirements (in force from May 1938 to
January 1939) excluded all but a small minority of wealthy and/or
well-connected applicants. What happened to the remainder? The
names and biographical details of a large number of these unsuc-
cessful applicants are known to us through the records of the india
office. By cross-referencing these names against databases for vic-
tims and survivors of the holocaust, it might be possible to deter-
mine how many of them were ultimately able to escape the nazi
onslaught.66
iV. Conclusion
To return to the question posed in the introduction: how does one
create a cohesive analysis from a topic comprised of multiple case
studies, spread across at least two continents? one must take into
account not only the various perspectives of the actors involved, but
also their differing levels of power and agency; in other words, their
ability to determine the administrative framework in which the
refugees were enmeshed from the moment they applied for exile, to
the moment they left india. Yet, as i hope i have demonstrated, des -
pite its logistical, methodological, and conceptual challenges, re -
search on this topic has the potential to provide important new
insights into the relationship between modern Jewish, German, and
indian history, and to elucidate further the extra-european dimen-
sions of the holocaust.
This article has proposed a number of possible approaches that
could be employed to this end, categorized according to the three
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66 such databases include the international Tracing service, Yad Vashem, the
united states holocaust Memorial Museum, and country-specific records
held in the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz) and the uni -
versity of Vienna.
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main groups involved. ultimately, however, it is difficult, and prob-
ably not advisable, to study any of these groups in isolation, since, as
the foregoing discussion has shown, they interacted with each other
in significant ways. All should therefore be taken into consideration
when researching this topic, even if the focus is on one group in par-
ticular. ideally, the historian should employ a different ‘lens’ to bring
them together: the backdrop of the indian independence movement,
for example, which incorporates anti-colonial politics, activism and
violence, waning colonial authority, and, finally, partition, which
many refugees witnessed. or one could take gender and consider
how the (overwhelmingly male) British colonial and Jewish relief
institutions interacted with both male and female refugees, for
instance, in the process of applying for visas, in finding employment,
and in relation to what was considered ‘proper’ comportment in a
colonial society. examining these three groups has also revealed a
surprising array of emotions—suspicion, sympathy, indifference,
frustration, indignation, alienation, fear, anxiety, trauma, and grief,
to name a few—felt and expressed by all sides. how did these shape
and determine refugees’ experiences? Answers to some of these
questions will, i hope, start to appear as research on this topic pro-
gresses over the coming years.
Joseph Cronin is a Lecturer at Queen Mary university London
and was a researcher at the German historical institute London in
from 2017 to 2019. he works on twentieth-century Central and east
european history, particularly German-Jewish history, migration his-
tory, and the history of the holocaust and its legacy. his ph.D. look -
ed at Jewish immigrants from the former soviet union to Germany in
the 1990s.
74
Cronin Article_Article template (footnotes).qxd  08.08.2019  12:21  Page 74
